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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing analyses that aim to confront
the problem of marked variation. Negatively marked diﬀerences are those natural varia-
tions that are used to cleave human beings into diﬀerent categories (e.g., of disablement, of
medicalized pathology, of subnormalcy, or of deviance). The problem of marked variation
is: Why are some rather than other variations marked as epistemically or culturally signif-
icant or as a diagnostic of pathology, and What is the epistemic background that makes
these—rather than other variations—marked as subnormal? For Wilson (2018a), critical
examination of the problem of marked variation is central to understanding the epistemol-
ogy of medicalized pathology that made the history of eugenics possible. My aim is to
explore the role marked variation plays in eugenic and other problematic classiﬁcations
and the inferences they appear to license. I pay particular attention to the normative val-
uations of marked variations, how these valuations aﬀect the inferences that are made by
others about those possessing the variation, and how those possessing the variation per-
ceive themselves. In the ﬁnal sections, I illustrate this by critically discussing three putative
kinship conceptions of race. I rely on these to extend the scope of the puzzle of marked
variation from the context of historic and current markings of an individual’s variation as
disability in the eugenics movement to historic and current markings for assigning putative
racial ascriptions to individuals and groups. Lastly, I suggest that the problem of marked
variation is a problem that looms over any epistemic account that is dependent upon sorting
or classifying.
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1 TheNormativity of Human Classiﬁcatory Practices
Eugenics emerged in the nineteenth century as a putative science of human improvement. Its
aim was to use scientiﬁc knowledge and the techniques of selective breeding used by animal and
plant breeders to restrict the reproduction of certain kinds of people and enhance the reproduc-
tion of others in an eﬀort to improve humanity in each subsequent generation (Wilson 2018a).
After their emergence, eugenic practices continued and were justiﬁed as powerful ameliorative
tools used to sort the socially desirable from the socially undesirable (Wilson 2018a; Valles 2012;
Caspari 2003).1 How is it possible that eugenic practices have persisted for so long? An attempt
to answer this question invites a further question: What do we need to do, and Who must we
listen to in order to hear and understand the answers to the “How is it possible?” question?
What is clear is that the continued subhumanization of those thought to possess traits deemed
undesirable and/or pathological demands careful investigation. Careful investigationmeans ask-
ing why eugenic practices have persisted as well as what eﬀects these have on individuals whose
mental variation was marked as defective and used to justify subhumanizing practices such as
forced or coercive sterilization and institutionalization. Understanding the history of eugenics
and its persistence requires a critical historical, sociological, and philosophical investigation that
includes the narratives of those harmed. However, to understand how those harms were even
conceivable also requires an exploration of the very classiﬁcatory activities that were used to
discriminate between those deemed “mental defectives”2 and those who were not.
Robert Wilson (2018a) carefully and critically explores these and related problems in The
Eugenic Mind Project (TEMP hereafter). Wilson begins to address the ﬁrst set of questions in
Parts I and III. Part II examines how certain variations aremarked as defective and used to justify
the mistreatment of those possessing the pathologized variation. Wilson examines the various
classiﬁcations of disablement and medicalized pathology that aim to describe people that are
“regarded as being, in some medically signiﬁcant way, subnormal” (Wilson 2018a, 104). Their
“subnormalcy” refers to “forms of human variation that tend to be viewed as falling below the
normal” (Wilson 2018a, 104). These deﬁnitionsmay seem vague, but by deﬁning “subnormalcy”
in this way,Wilson avoids problematic descriptions of human variation as negative except insofar
as they have been socially or historically deﬁned as such. While he addresses the history of
eugenics, Wilson’s explicit aim in TEMP is to investigate how “eugenic thinking” has operated
and uncover the reasons why the practice of sorting humans is epistemically as well as socially
problematic (Wilson 2018c, this volume).
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing analyses that aim to confront the
problem of marked variation. To do this, I begin by critically engaging with Wilson’s account
in Part II of TEMP.3 I then explore the normative valuations of these marked variations, how
the valuations aﬀect the inferences that are made by others about those possessing the variation,
and how those possessing the variation perceive themselves. I will go on to suggest that Wil-
1For instance, the Sterilization Act of Alberta, Canada was still in force in 1972 (see Grekul, Krahn, and
Odynak 2004; Wilson 2018a; The Eugenics Archive at http://eugenicsarchive/discover/world; andMuir v. Alberta
(1996) Dominion Law Reports 132 (4th Series) 695–762. Canada LII 7287).
2Sean Valles’s (2012) work on the history of eugenics is a particularly useful resource for those seeking further
articulation of the way in which marked variations were used to classify “mental defectives.” Valles pays particular
attention to how variations in IQ were used to pathologize some and normalize others. He does this by draw-
ing on Lionel Penrose’s (1933) distinction between the classiﬁcation of “subcultural mental defects” and that of
“pathological mental defects.”
3It is because of the potentially signiﬁcant and long-ranging impact that his argument might have on classiﬁ-
catory practices in a wide range of ﬁelds, that I have chosen to focus on chapters ﬁve and six: “Where do ideas of
human variation come from?” and “A socio-cognitive framework for marked variation” within Part II.
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son’s inquiry within Part II involves asking questions that not only help reveal the problematic
practices of classifying humans in the context of eugenics and disability, but also may shed light
on the normative aspects of many other classiﬁcatory practices. In doing so, my aim will be to
show that the problem of marked variation is a problem that looms over any epistemic account
that is dependent upon sorting. In the ﬁnal section, I illustrate this by critically discussing three
putative kinship conceptions of race. I rely on these to extend the scope of the puzzle of marked
variation from the context of historic and current markings of an individual’s variation as dis-
ability in the eugenics movement to historic and current markings for assigning putative racial
ascriptions to individuals and groups.
Variation is ubiquitous. This is true of humans as much as it is of the rest of the living
world. We compare ourselves as the same or as diﬀerent to others by relying on cues to identify
what we may consider to be a particularly helpful or informative grouping. We may consider
these resultant groupings to be either natural or artiﬁcial. For instance, we may assume that
the groupings we consider to be natural are simply those that can be discovered, read oﬀ the
structure of reality, or can be known self-evidently. That we distinguish natural from artiﬁcial
groupings is indisputable. But asking how we do so, whether we should, and what harms come
by sorting in this way, allows us to better understand the meaning attached to these groupings,
the motivation for the categorization, the purposes they have been used for, and their historical
origins. Considering the role these and other normative considerations play in our classiﬁcations
of the world may provide insight into how and why we sort individuals into groups.
The history of biological classiﬁcation exempliﬁes the diﬀerent ways in which organisms
are sorted into groups. Shared essential features, family resemblances, continuous phylogenetic
lineages, the possession of shared homeostatic properties or mechanisms, genetic markers, and
the coordination of symbionts have all been used to determine membership within diﬀerent
biological categories. Biological categories, such as species, may refer simply to taxonomic units
(Dupré 1999, 18). But they may also be used in a way that suggests the category is in some sense
“natural,” because it is a discoverable grouping of individuals who share a common property or
relationship (e.g., descended from the same lineage).4
Assuming that a group is natural implies that there are certain ways in which it is delimitable.
As such, it leads to certain practices of delimitation that rely on speciﬁc understandings of the
causes of its naturalness and tracks these in terms of certain kinds of processes, products, events,
and relationships which are taken to be causally signiﬁcant in deﬁning any group or lineage
(Kendig 2014, 157). Doing so constrains membership within the category. For instance, if a
lineage conception is used to deﬁne the category, it is the series of actual reproductive events
of interbreeding individuals that is the focus of attention. Reliance on lineages may (but does
not necessarily) also rely on a presumption that what makes lineages evolutionary natural units
is that there is an exchange of genetic material between organisms. Many classiﬁcations and
sortings rely on deploying concepts that signal diﬀerence. Organisms, including humans, are
distinguished from one another and classiﬁed in terms of certain variations. These putative
diﬀerence makers may furnish investigators with the grounds on which to make inferences over
the categories. In this way, the classiﬁcation of organisms seems to involve an epistemic valuing
of certain variations over others. When considering the classiﬁcation of non-human organisms,
we might consider the reliance on these variations to be relatively uncontroversial even if we
might disagree about which variations are the best to identify in order to make good inferences
over the category and admit that there may be no value-free way of identifying which variations
4Membership in the species category, for example, has been linked to over 27 diﬀerent conceptions of species
which rely on genetic, ecological, phylogenetic, morphological, and a host of other characteristics, processes, and
relationships (Wilkins 2011).
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to select. However, when considering the sorting of humans, the reliance on variation and
diﬀerence appears much more problematic.
Wilson distinguishes the relatively unproblematic reliance on what might be called “mere
variation” from the problematic use which is “marked variation” (see Wilson 2018a, 103–104).
In distinguishing the former from the latter, Wilson also tackles the assumption that the status
of a group’s naturalness is self-evident. Relying on the history and narrative records of individu-
als aﬀected by the eugenics movement, he describes what has happened and what continues to
happen when certain forms of human cognitive and physical variation are identiﬁed as putative
pathological markers for an individual to be considered to have a eugenic mind. These were
treated as diagnostic variations which marked the individual in possession of them as being of
eugenic interest. Detection of these eugenic-marked variations meant the individual was con-
sidered a candidate for conﬁnement, institutionalization, sterilization, or any other intervention
that was justiﬁed by the goal of human improvement. She was someone who belonged within
the category for whom eugenic practices were appropriate, e.g., detention within institutions de-
voted to the isolation and medical intervention of those pathologized as possessing a disability
of eugenic interest.
2 The Puzzle of Marked Variation
Carefully articulating the recent and distant history of the eugenic movement and the harms
it meted out to those marked makes it clear that there is a diﬀerence between mere and neg-
atively marked variation. Negatively marked diﬀerences were (and continue to be) treated as
those natural variations that cleave human beings into diﬀerent categories (e.g., of disablement,
of medicalized pathology, of subnormalcy, or of deviance).5 But what exactly is the nature of
this diﬀerence, and how is it that some variations are marked and others are not? Considering
why certain human variations are negatively marked (e.g., race, disability, sexual orientation)
seems to issue in a puzzle when considered in terms of why some rather than other variations
are marked as epistemically or culturally signiﬁcant or as a diagnostic of pathology. Wilson sets
out this puzzle succinctly in the form of a question that leads his later investigation: “What is it
that provides the basis for our registration of disablement andmedicalized pathology as forms of
marked, subnormal variation?” (Wilson 2018a, 104). That is, what is the epistemic background
that makes these—rather than other variations—marked as subnormal? This question concerns
the epistemology of medicalized pathology that made the history of eugenics possible. It is
a question that Wilson positions within feminist epistemology, disability studies, standpoint
theory, the extended mind thesis, philosophy of biology, and phenomenology. Doing so, he
articulates the site(s) of marked variation in a relationship in terms of the phenomenological
state of the individual. This a two (or more) person relationship. It includes both what-it’s-
like to be the person whose variation is marked as a form of disablement and the marking of
that diﬀerence by another as disabled for the purpose of sorting them from others considered
to belong to the privative category of non-disabled. But this relationship is contained within a
wider context. As such, it is not simply one’s individual variations that are marked as subnormal.
Variation is coded as disability only if the social context that the person lives within provides
inadequate accommodation for the negative eﬀects of the variation. The marking is not of the
person but of the limitations within the person’s social environment which fails to compensate
for one’s variability (Wilson 2018a, 106–110). How we self-identify as diﬀerently-abled and
self-adjust in virtue of our variation is frustrated when our attempts to make adjustments are
5The focus here is on negatively marked variation. But marked variation may not always have negative conno-
tations. It is also how we may choose to identify ourselves and about how we see ourselves as relating to others.
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thwarted by (or limited) by our environment or if our self-identiﬁcation is misread or inten-
tionally contravened. This is not to say that disability is socially constructed.6 It is both real
in the phenomenal experiences of those whose attempts are thwarted, and in the harmful as-
sessments of them (as a result of negatively marking their variation) as subnormal. If saying
disability is socially constructed means it is unreal or made by others then doing so ignores the
very phenomenal nature of lived experience—within a body that is ours and the pursuit of a life
that we value as well as one that is valued by others. Wilson suggests reality is located in the
choice of cognitive resources we use, whether these choices are aided or frustrated by our social
structure, the normative impact our marked variation makes on us, and the cognitive resources
available to us. These may include individual cognition as well as group level cognition, shared
intentionality, or other situated or extended forms of cognition that we may be aﬀorded in our
environment.
3 Shared Intentionality and the Use of “Like Us” Detectors
Shared intentionality is what makes normative assessments of variation possible according to
Wilson. It is the intentionality we don’t have on our own but as the result of our sociality and
in virtue of our shared cognitively-mediated normativity (Wilson 2018a, 128–130). This nor-
mativity aﬀects how we sort people into categories and by what criteria. People sort themselves
and each other into categories based on morphological, physiological, neurological, and phy-
logenetic criteria. But they also sort on the basis of vocations, avocations, or where they go
on holiday. When meeting new people, we might ﬁnd sociability in learning that we both are
runners or gastronomists.
One way we sort human beings into groups is deciding whether they are “like us” or “not
like us” in some important way. Doing so, we refer to ourselves in terms of being a member
of a certain sort of group and decide whether someone else is or not part of that same group
(see Wilson 2018a, 132). What counts as being “like us” in some important way may diﬀer
depending on context, interest at the moment, or the way in which we are in the world at
that time. We consider whether someone is “like us” by considering who we are, how we are
living, where, and for what purpose. We reﬂect on our self-identity and what we take to be the
identifying features of ourselves as members in that group of which we feel we are a part. If
someone shares those features we might count them as “one of us.” Of course, this marking
may or may not track how the individual marked by us as “like us” actually self-identiﬁes herself.
In contrast, she may perceive me to have a variation that marks me in a category separate to her.
She may deem that I am not like her in a way important to her and that she uses to mark herself
by and therefore she marks my variation as diﬀerent from hers. I would therefore be marked as
“not like us” for her and because of that, I may also be considered “subnormal” for those, like
her, who self-identify as “normal.”
Wilson regards “like us” detectors as a set of “underlying cognitive mechanisms [that] oper-
ate on normatively meaningful social categories, some of which (such as kinship) are key to our
prosocial life, others of which operate on marked variation in other domains” (Wilson 2018a,
137). LikeNaomi Zack (1993, 2001), Shelley Tremain (2001), and LindaMartín Alcoﬀ (1995),
Wilson sees the kind of knowledge generated by these classiﬁcations as deploying not just a form
of knowledge about oneself and how one thinks of those like her, but about how others com-
municate with her based on who they think she is. Whereas Zack and Alcoﬀ focus on issues
6Individuals self-described as neurological, physiological, or morphologically atypical may perceive and mark
themselves and their variation as atypical in order to disclose their variation and signal their diﬃculties accommo-
dating to certain environments.
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of self-identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of humans in terms of race, ethnicity, sex and gender,
Wilson follows Tremain in focusing on the classiﬁcations of ablement and disablement.
4 Externally Mediated, Cognitively Driven Normativity
The sorting of people into those “like us” and those “not like us” has been widely discussed within
the study of the history, philosophy and social studies of disability studies and critical race theory.
But the way in which Wilson investigates the cognitive faculties that make marked variation
possible in the context of the eugenics movement may prove additionally useful in considering
the puzzle of negatively marked variation within these and in other areas. A general version of
the problem of marked variation seems to be Wilson’s target: “[If cognitive function relies on a
sort of “like us” mechanism], then all it would take for us to end up with the kind of diﬀerence
between people being marked as subnormal is for the norms that make someone not like me,
that is, not a member of my group, to be ones that class as subnormal those people who have (or
even simply are perceived to have) disabilities or impaired parts as subnormal” (Wilson 2018a,
208). In positing ﬁrst-person plural knowledge such as “like-us” detectors, Wilson tries to
capture the phenomenology of marked variation by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms that
make it possible in very diﬀerent social and cultural circumstances. His signiﬁcant contribution
in TEMP is that he focuses on the cognitive processes that make these sortings manifest rather
than simply focusing on the sortings themselves.
That is, he asks, what is going on cognitively when one sorts people into groups? This process
is not merely located in the inner thoughts of the classiﬁer. Sorting, like many other cognitive
activities is something that can only be satisfactorily described as an extended process rather
than one accommodated by a purely internalist conception of mind. For those familiar with
his work in philosophy of mind, Chapters 5 and 6 will seem philosophically contiguous with
his previous research. But in TEMP, external mindedness takes on an ineluctably normative
dimension: “So we have a kind of externally mediated, cognitively driven normativity, and it
constitutes an important feature of human social life. One thing that this cognitively mediated
normativity does is allow us to distinguish not simply between individual people but between
kinds or sorts of people …” (Wilson 2018a, 130).
One of the most conceptually provocative aims of TEMP is to investigate how people cat-
egorize other people and what impact that has on those categorized, the categorizers, and the
communities that have sustained these activities of sorting people. I am particularly sympathetic
to this aim, as elsewhere I’ve discussed the importance of focusing on classiﬁcatory activities such
as sortings or “kindings” rather than simply the products of those activities (Kendig 2016, 5–6).
I suggested that ﬁnding out how people sort and categorize might reveal normative aspects of
the practices employed in classifying that could not be known by simply investigating the resul-
tant categories. Knowing the route by which people sorted subjects of interest into categories
may aﬀect our valuation of the category and whether we take it to be a credible category. Rather
than relying on folk conceptions, biological conceptions, or even sociological conceptions that
have been used to classify and sort people, we must also focus on how people classify people.
What are people thinking and doing when they distinguish between individuals? Or when they
ascribe some people to one kind or sort, and other people to another sort?7
7Wilson points out that this is not a discussion of ﬁnding some sort of natural kind for humans, nor is the
project one that aims to ﬁnd some common property or set of properties all people share. Neither is the project
one which aims to ﬁnd some social or biological notion that exists irrespective of our way of thinking about the
world.
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In the remainder of this paper, my aim will be twofold. First, I explore Wilson’s suggestion
that we can investigate normativity via shared intentionality in discussions of classiﬁcation by
what he calls an “externally mediated, cognitively driven normativity.” Secondly, I consider the
role marked variation plays in classifying humans and how “like us” detectors might apply in
other areas of research. To do this, I will brieﬂy sketch and evaluate three ways people have
sorted others into putative kinship groupings using “like us” and “not like us.”
5 Sorting with “Like Us” Detectors
I agree with Wilson’s diagnosis: some recognized variations don’t hold much epistemic weight
(for instance: what day of the week someone was born on; whether they have two middle names,
or one, or none; or whether they wear their hair up or down), whereas others are both recog-
nized and thought to hold some or much epistemic weight. Possession of these variations are
thought to license certain inferences based on knowing that the individual possesses them. But
althoughWilson points to the connection between possession of variations and how this aﬀects
the inferences made on the basis of these, I think much more could be made of this. I suggest
that the problem of marked variation is a problem that looms over any epistemic account that is
dependent upon sorting. To do this I will consider an application that Wilson does not address
in TEMP: conceptions of race.
Elsewhere (Kendig 2011, 200–202), I’ve examined how some putative kinship notions of
race rely on coding certain perceived variations as diagnostic markers that can be used to deter-
mine whether an individual belongs to a particular racial classiﬁcation or not.8 Concentrating
on another form of marked variation, Ron Amundson (2000) critically discusses the problem-
atic nature of the concept of normal function in a way that is particularly helpful in elucidating
the more global nature of the problem of marked variation I have in mind. It also serves to
justify my focus on conceptions of race in order to extend the scope of the problem. Amundson
writes:
I consider the concept of normal function to be similar to the traditional concept
of race. Like the concept of race, the concept of biological normality is invoked to
explain certain socially signiﬁcant diﬀerences, such as unemployment and segrega-
tion. Like the concept of race, the concept of normality is a biological error. The
partitioning of human variation into the normal versus the abnormal has no ﬁrmer
biological footing than the partitioning into races. Diversity of function is a fact of
biology. (Amundson 2000, 34)
In the remaining sections of this paper, I discuss three putative kinship conceptions of race.
I rely on these to extend the scope of the puzzle of marked variation from the context of historic
and current markings of an individual’s variation as disability in the eugenics movement to
historic and current markings for assigning putative racial ascriptions to individuals and groups.
The ﬁrst of these are the widely used “one-drop rules” in the United States.
5.1 One-drop rules
“One-drop rules” refers to a number of laws ﬁrst enacted during slavery and were common in
the southern United States. The original rule was set into law in North Carolina in 1802 (Gobu
8For a critical survey and analysis of the kinship conceptions of race as well as the morphological, biomedical,
subspecies, population, and social constructionist conceptions of race see Kendig 2011.
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v. Gobu, 1 NC 188). The last was upheld in 1982 (Omi andWinant 1994). These were laws for
assessing the purity or impurity of an individual’s ancestral lineage. They were widely used to
determine whether an individual was “like us” or “not like us” when the diagnostic markers used
to negatively mark variation failed. Ancestry was used as the back-up litmus test for ensuring
purity of someone’s race and was used as an additional mechanism for the detection of marked
variations. In providing a means of detecting the presence of a non-white ancestor, their aim
was to protect and regulate white privilege against the perceived threat of its gradual dilution by
multiracial individuals. Their continued use is evident in the widespread use of a dichotomous
racial division in ascribing an individual’s race by selectively ignoring part of their ancestral
history; that is, “black” used to refer to individuals of multiple racial backgrounds, and “white”
was reserved for someone who had very distant ancestors identiﬁed as black. In practice, one-
drop rules often took the form of witch-hunt-like searches for any distant black ancestors of
individuals living as, and accepted as, white. Although originally aimed at black and white
races, the absolute intolerance to those of “mixed race” was not limited to those of black and
white ancestry (Kendig 2011, 201–202).
The use of one-drop rules persists (cf. Omi and Winant 2000), but it often relies on folk
genetics of racial inheritance: individuals inherit all of their genes from their parents, genes code
for traits, and so all of their racial traits are encoded in the genes they inherit from their parents.
Individuals have the same traits, same genes, same talents, same diseases, and same behaviours
as their ancestors because these are all reliably inherited through a pure, unbroken lineage of
ancestors. Its use has played into the growing interest in genetic testing kits as diagnostic for
discovering one’s “true” ancestry. Not only does this view overestimate the role of genes in
development, it mistakenly assumes the identity of genes across generations. The genes we
inherit from our parents are not the same, they are neither materially nor structurally identical
with our own. Not only are the genes not identical across generations, they are also non-identical
within the trillions of cells of one’s body throughout one’s ontogeny (Kendig 2011, 207–209).
5.2 You-know-one-when-you-see-one
The second putative kinship grouping that uses “like us” and “not like us” detectors is one of the
most proliﬁc kinship notions of race. It is a sort of you-know-one-when-you-see-one concep-
tion of race that I refer to as the “naïve-recognition concept of race” (Kendig 2011, 204–208).
Although not labelled as such, it is a view widely discussed and criticized (Zack 2001; Piper
1992). The naïve-recognition concept of race is a folk social-scientiﬁc notion that assumes that
race is exactly how “we” judge it, assuming that “we” all perceive race in the same way. This
kinship notion is often justiﬁed with genealogical evidence that is sociologically determined.
For instance, it groups human beings into racial kinds based on whether they are part of the
same family tree. But the signiﬁcance of these biological relationships and their use in con-
structing family trees is biologically given but ritually determined by sociological and cultural
interests, e.g., paternal inheritance of the family name, maternal inheritance, or the lineage of
the mother’s brother. Family trees are never produced without heavy pruning. Without system-
atic pruning of certain branches, one would end up with a never-ending tree (Müller-Wille and
Rheinberger 2009). According to this widely adopted kinship conception, an individual is the
same race as her parents if her parents both belong to the same race as each other (Gelman and
Wellman 1991; Carey and Spelke 1994). The naïve-recognition concept of kinship is similar
to what is often taken to be a “common-sense biological notion” used by Mayr (2002, 90–92).
In framing his subspecies conception of race, Mayr suggests that although many characteris-
tics are just quantitative or descriptive, others—the Diego blood group for individuals of Native
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American ancestry and Tay-Sachs disease for those of Jewish descent—are “virtually diagnostic”
(May 2002, 92). And later, relying on the assumption that there are folk biological races, he
suggests, “if I introduce you to an Eskimo and a Kalahari Bushman I won’t have much trouble
convincing you that they belong to diﬀerent races” (Mayr 2002, 90). This naïve realism assumes
the judgement of another’s race is given—unmediated—to “us.” This requires the further as-
sumption that the “us” is taken to be a generic perceiver. In privileging this generic perceiver,
the possibility of other perceivers holding diﬀerent positions is ignored.
5.3 Common blood
Looking at the ways in which both the naïve recognition concept and the one-drop rules were
used to categorize people according to a putative conception of kinship reveals the negative
marking of variation and its negative use in regulating the inheritance of white privilege. The
process by which individuals used these “like us” or “not like us” detectors can be contrasted
with W. E. B. Du Bois’s positive notion of race in terms of “common blood”:
a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always
of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and invol-
untarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly
conceived ideals of life. (Du Bois 1897/2000, 110)
DuBois seeks amore explicitly social-scientiﬁc notion of kinship than the seemingly biologically-
tied kinship account of the one-drop rules or the naïve recognition conception. He does so by
referring to a “vast family” sharing a “common history.” The notion of “blood quantum” used
in some Native American tribes may initially appear to function in a similar social-familial way
as Du Bois’s common blood, since it is used to determine one’s belonging to a particular tribe.9
Du Bois’s notion of common blood emphasizes at once the physical, psychological, and socio-
logical continuity among individuals of the same race. Together with common history and vast
family it frames his sociohistorical conception of race, one that emphasizes multiple routes by
which race is passed on. I would suggest that Du Bois’s sociohistorical conception provides a
clear way to understandWilson’s account of cognitively-mediated normativity through engaged
community knowledge exchanges.
Du Bois calls the ability to recognize this value-based community knowledge “cultural recog-
nition.” A similar notion is described by Susan Wolf as “self-recognition” and Kyle Powys
Whyte discusses something similar in terms of diﬀerent interpretations of “traditional ecological
knowledge.” What is counted as community knowledge and what role it plays within the com-
munity is dependent upon the traditions, values, and origin stories of that community (Whyte
2013). They shape the environmental, moral, and governance relationships that are part of in-
digenous communities and are reciprocally co-constructed by them. The relationships between
individuals—human, animal, plant, soil, weather, and spiritual elements are often intertwined.
It is in the activities of making and maintaining relationships that is the focus. For instance,
9However, whereas Du Bois’s common blood was intended to positively unify a “vast family” in a way that
expressed an understanding of their common history, the practical uses of blood quantum make the comparison
more complicated. Blood quantum has been used to unify. But it has also been used as enrollment criteria to
negatively police tribal membership. Membership in some tribes is an oﬃcial claim as it is within the remit of
the US Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs to control what is called a “Certiﬁcates of Degree of Indian or Alaska Native
Blood” (CDIB). With a CDIB, one gains eligibility to a host of federal beneﬁts that are exclusively held for Native
Americans. It also provides proof that one is a member of a tribal nation. (For a detailed account see Spruhan
2018).
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in discussing knowledge exchange between indigenous and non-indigenous institutions of envi-
ronmental governance, native scholars Raymond Pierotti and DanielWildcat suggest that there
is community self-knowledge that is
based in the knowledge that native societies existed under conditions of constant
pressure on the resources upon which they depended, and that a means had to
be found to convince communities and families to economize with regard to their
use of natural resources … The connections that are a crucial aspect of traditional
ecological knowledge (TEK) are based on a mixture of extraction, e.g. animals are
taken as prey, combined with recognition of the inherent value and good of non-
human lives. Traditional knowledge is based on the premise that humans should
not view themselves as responsible for nature, i.e., we are not stewards of the nature
world, but instead that we are a part of that world, no greater than any other part. In
this wayTEKdeals largely withmotivating humans to show respect for nonhumans.
(Pierotti and Wildcat 2000, 1336, as quoted in Whyte 2013, 4)
These appear to be views complementary to whatWilson refers to as a shared intentionality—
the conditions that make normative assessments of variation possible. ForWilson, this seems to
come from the nature of our socio-ecologically-embedded and cognitively extended experience:
human beings experience the world through their bodies. That experience is always of a body
situated in a certain place at a certain time and in relation to others’ bodies is not a new view.
But the focus of these diverse accounts of shared intentionality, cultural and self-recognition
seems to be on the underlying causal reciprocity between an individual’s experiences of herself
within her environments, her interactions with others, and the knowledge exchange within a
community. I would suggest that relying on these accounts and the extensive work in disability
studies, critical race theory, and feminist epistemology provides us with necessary tools of inves-
tigation. These may help reveal the connection between how we see ourselves and how we see
others as like or unlike us. Doing so could further our attempts to understand why these “like
us” comparisons have led to violence against those marked as “not like us” in some cases, while
in others they have been employed intentionally by a community as a way of self-marking that
allows for aﬃrmation within a community.
6 HowMightWe Know when the Sorter Gets ItWrong?
How can we eliminate the problematic nature of marked variation but keep the ability of in-
dividuals to self-identify, preserve culture-framing narratives, and attribute felt diﬀerences as
markers to belonging to a particular group culture? Because these manifest in such diﬀerent
ways (the former in potential harm and violence, the latter in recognition and aﬃrmation), we
require a way of understanding the processes by which people mark, how they mark, and for
what purpose.
This is especially true if how one is perceived by others as well as how one perceives oneself
and their own self-identiﬁcation—in terms of sex, gender, sexual orientation, or race—is liminal.
Racial categorization may change throughout a person’s life depending on where they live, what
they experience, and how these are perceived by others as well as themselves (Kendig 2011,
212–217). This change may be due to the categorizations available to them. For instance, a
young woman living in the US might be classiﬁed in 1920 as “Hindu,” in 1940 be considered
“White,” in 1960 become “Other,” and in 1980 be “Asian” according to the categorizes used in
US Census data collection (Nobles 2000). Racial categorization may also be dependent upon
an interaction between them and others, for example, how an individual is perceived by others
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or is seeking to be perceived by others. In either case, an individual’s perceived identity relies
on, is thwarted by, or is in some way inﬂuenced by stereotypes that underpin those categories
(cf. Zack 2010; Hom 2018).10
Human classiﬁcatory practices do not occur randomly. In order to sort a person (including
ourselves) into a category, we rely on stereotypes that underpin those categories. The stereotypes
underpinning those categories may be damaging. Our use of themmay serve to perpetuate these
stereotypes both in ourselves and in our ascriptions of others we believe belong to that category.
Sociologists, Aliya Saperstein and Andrew M. Penner (2012) performed a longitudinal study
focusing on how racial ascription by others aﬀects one’s own racial self-identiﬁcation and leads to
internalized racist stereotypes. They found that people who have been unemployed, incarcerated
or on welfare for a sustained period of time are signiﬁcantly less likely to be classiﬁed by others
and identify themselves as “White” despite being classiﬁed as “White” in the previous year.
And they are more likely to be identiﬁed as “Black” and self-identify as “Black” (Saperstein and
Penner 2012, 698–701).
Wilson’s approach to the problem of marked variation in the context of his exploration
of new eugenics, provides a further set of considerations that promises to be beneﬁcial to the
ongoing discussion. But what seems to be missing is a response to the following questions: How
might we know when the sorter gets it wrong? And: To what or to whom do we defer as arbiter
of the correctness or incorrectness of the categories to which a sorter ascribes an individual? We
surely want to say that there is a way of getting it wrong. That it isn’t the case that the sorter
can just sort like with like and in any way that is proﬁtable for the sorter. As Wilson’s TEMP
has shown, at least sometimes the sorting goes horribly wrong, and at most, it often does.
For instance, we might consider the identiﬁcation of someone as being lesbian, gay, straight,
bisexual, or queer as something that, in sorting people, we can get wrong. Of course, we can
get it wrong regardless of whether we are of the same sexual orientation as the individual or
of a diﬀerent one. But I think the more interesting question is: What are the truth-makers
for the correspondence of our putative categories of sorts of people and the “real” identity of
the individual as belonging to a group? It seems obvious that someone’s own self-identiﬁcation
should be a truth-maker in this case. But, are these truth-makers all we need? For instance,
can someone be harmed on the basis of a hate crime directed to them as the object of hate on
the basis of being perceived as gay even if the person self-identiﬁes as straight? Most would
say that there is still harm that outstrips that harm done to the individual; there is also violence
committed against the community. There might be harm to the community if the perpetrator
of the hate crime relied upon detection of a marked diﬀerence he or she believed was shared by
the members of the target community. In committing the hate crime, the perpetrator marked
the diﬀerence as deviant or pathological, and one, when detected in another was license for
mistreatment and harm. Harm to the community would then still be done even if the victim of
the hate crime was not a member of the targeted community.
Attempting to understand the conditions under which we can decide whether a particular
categorization is correct or incorrect connects us back to the larger puzzle of marked variation.
My suspicion is that we might not ﬁnd a general solution to the problem of marked variation
in all cases, (e.g., disability studies, critical race theory, or gender and sexuality studies), as there
are signiﬁcant diﬀerences which might may make this impossible (see, for instance, Hom 2018).
But even if wemight not ﬁnd a general solution that would reveal the conditions under which we
can decide whether a categorization is correct or incorrect as well as what are the truth-makers
10Asking how (and why) a sorter misidentiﬁes the category to which someone belongs seems to require careful
understanding of the notion of “passing” and the multiple historical and current contexts within which it is used
(see Spencer 2000; Sexton 2008; Zack 2010).
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required in determining this, I would still suggest that seeking the grounds by which we might
know when the sorter gets it wrong surely should be part of our investigation.
7 Disability as an Epistemic Resource
TEMP begins with an explicit premise: knowledge is always culturally, historically, and socially
situated. This seems to me to pose an insurmountable problem. That is, how might we resolve
the puzzle of marked variation if the social ascription of our categorization seems to always su-
pervene on the properties of the individuals for whom the categorization is intended to include?
If the groupings one relies upon to make sense of the variation in the world rely on ﬁrst-person
plural perspectives which are informed by our conceptual, historical, cultural, social, and envi-
ronmental conditions, how can we avoid negative marked variation? Wilson’s solution is to treat
disability as an epistemic resource. Doing so, Wilson positions himself at the interdisciplinary
nexus of standpoint theory, philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology, and disability studies.
In doing so he follows Kafer (2013), Harding (1991, 2004), Garland-Thompson (2012), and
Wylie (2004, 2012). But, I suggest, the approach he takes is also consistent with those inter-
ested in philosophy of science in practice, who take on the activities of science in addition to
its products as the focus of investigation. This is an approach which emphasizes the need to
consider the knower(s) and not just what is known (cf. Grene 1966).11
The use of disability as epistemic resource means that when we consider the phenomenal
experience of someone experiencing a disability and hear their ﬁrst-person narrative, we may
“discover alternative ways of being in the world … [and] recognize and value interdependence”
(Kafer 2013, 83). The use of disability and narrative as epistemic resources is not limited to
the ﬁrst-person plural perspective. The what-it’s-like for an individual to have knowledge of
themselves and the world around them may also include extended forms of cognition. Their
narrative may also include joint intentionality, novel tool use, prosthetics, and alternative ways
of maneuvering or thinking in the world. In this way, narrative is intended to be a site of
engagement that allows us to focus on how people talk about their lives, their sense of place,
how they sustain their ways of living and stories that they use to talk about themselves. This
awareness is gained by attending to how someone who may be initially perceived as not-like-
us attains her knowledge, how she uses this knowledge, and how we might understand the
conditions that make her knowledge possible.
8 ConcludingThoughts
Biological classiﬁcation and the classiﬁcation of people in particular is a topic long discussed
within philosophy of biology, disability studies, gender and sexuality studies, and critical race
theory. Within philosophy of biology, the processes of classifying—and not just the classiﬁca-
tions or the classiﬁcatory practices or protocols of classiﬁcation—are now more widely being
discussed. Recent discussions surrounding the nature of natural groupings have shifted to fo-
cus on the natural kinds and processes of kinding within diﬀerent contexts (see Kendig 2016).
Although this shift has highlighted the interest-relativity of discovering and constructing kinds
that are relevant in investigating certain research questions, values in classiﬁcation have also
been shown to play a signiﬁcant role in determining what (as well as how) we consider a sort
or kind to be relevant, useful, natural, and/or constructed. With new light being shed on this
11Although this is now a widespread approach, many attribute its origins to Marjorie Grene’s inﬂuential text,
The Knower and the Known 1966, and her later work (see also Grene 1985).
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role, I would suggest that there is a secondary set of questions arises with regard to scientiﬁc
practice. That is, how can we preserve valuable scientiﬁc inference-supporting biological clas-
siﬁcation whilst acknowledging their normativity? And how can we block the sinister eugenic
classiﬁcations in a way that acknowledges their epistemic, methodological, and evaluative errors?
Targeting these questions, Wilson (2018a) oﬀers a critical account of the sorting processes used
in classifying humans and shows not only how they are context sensitive, but also liable to cause
harm. My focus in this paper has been to explore the role marked variation has and continues
to play within the philosophy of classiﬁcation. Acknowledging how marked variation may lead
to problematic and at times vicious classiﬁcations and inferences requires understanding the
concepts used, by whom, for what purpose, and how these classiﬁcations aﬀect those classiﬁed.
As such, I suggest that the normative epistemological methods Wilson employs in TEMP will
be valuable to those pursuing a rigorously engaged philosophical approach to the problem of
negatively marked variation in a variety of diﬀerent disciplines.
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